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~~SECRET~~ / WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE  
 SOURCES AND METHODS ~~INVOLVED~~

FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)  
 - Intelligence Sources and  
 Methods

## Intelligence Division

## INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 3/31/75

[redacted] no information to date concerning possible terrorist plans to undertake hostile acts against Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during his forthcoming visit to Buenos Aires, Argentina. The date of this visit has not yet been announced.

E025x1- [redacted] massive security mobilization by the Argentine services will probably act as a deterrent to any attempt at direct action against Secretary Kissinger. The possibility exists that plans will be made to carry out other acts of terrorism in order to embarrass him, and to detract from the success of his visit. Harrassment operations, such as bombing attacks against U. S. firms in Buenos Aires, and street demonstrations are expected.

You will be advised of any pertinent developments in this matter.

RJO:kjg

RJO:W

ESP/SSM

WRW/TM

JAN

PCM

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FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)  
 - Intelligence Sources and  
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DOJ/FBI Methods

NNNNVV EIA277 EIA655IQA021

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 28 1975

TELETYPE

0 281857Z MAR 75

FM CIA

FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Dep. A-D-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. *✓* *✓*  
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*Putney/SSM*

*5-08647 CM*

109-12-201

109-12-201-2949

SECRET

SECTION 01 OF 3.

CITE

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- Intelligence Sources and  
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56 APR 10 1975

REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

COUNTRY : ARGENTINA

EO25x1

SUBJECT : ~~SECURITY SITUATION REPORT. ASSESSMENT OF THE~~  
~~POTENTIAL TERRORIST AND EXTREMIST THREAT TO~~  
~~SECRETARY KISSINGER AS~~   MARCH 1975

    HAVE NOT RECEIVED

ANY INFORMATION TO DATE RELATING TO POSSIBLE TERRORIST PLANS TO

UNDERTAKE HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY

KISSINGER DURING HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES.

OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS,   ONLY THE

~~MONTONEROS~~ HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO ATTEMPT SUCH ACTION, AS THE

A.S.G.

2

~~THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) ORGANIZATION IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA~~

PROVINCE HAS BEEN SEVERLY DISRUPTED BY RECENT POLICE ACTION.

THE MASSIVE SECURITY MOBILIZATION BY THE ARGENTINE SERVICES WILL PROBABLY ACT AS A DETERRENT TO ANY ATTEMPT TO UNDER-TAKE DIRECT ACTION AGAINST SECRETARY KISSINGER, BUT THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT PLANS WILL BE MADE TO CARRY OUT OTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM IN ORDER TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. OFFICIAL AND DETRACT FROM THE SUCCESS OF HIS VISIT. IT IS EXPECTED THAT MOST LEFTIST GROUPS, INCLUDING THE TERRORISTS, WILL UNDERTAKE HARRASSMENT OPERATIONS, SUCH AS BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. FIRMS IN BUENOS AIRES AND STREET DEMONSTRATIONS. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE IS EXPECTED MOMENTARILY, ALONG WITH A CORRESPONDING SHIFTING OF HIGH-LEVEL POLICE OFFICERS. THESE EXPECTED CHANGES WILL PROBABLY NOT HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE TO PROTECT SECRETARY KISSINGER.

END SUMMARY.

EO25x1

1.  COMMENT: IT IS JUDGED THAT OF THE SEVERAL TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN ARGENTINA, ONLY THE ERP AND THE MONTONEROS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO SECRETARY

PAGE 4

**SECRET**

KISSINGER. THE ERP, WHICH OPERATES UNDER THE POLITICAL UMBRELLA OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' PARTH (PRT), IS A MARXIST-LENINIST ORGANIZATION WHOSE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS TO IMPLANT A MARXIST STATE IN ARGENTINA THROUGH ARMED REBELLION AND CIVIL WAR. ALTHOUGH HISTORICALLY IT HAS ENJOYED A HIGH DEGREE OF SUCCESS WITH THE TRADITIONAL TACTICS OF URBAN WARFARE, THE ERP BEGAN TO EMPHASIZE RURAL GUERRILLA ACTIONS IN JANUARY 1974, WITH UNEVEN SUCCESS THUS FAR. THE ERP HAS AN ESTIMATE 400 TO 600 ARMED AND TRAINED COMBANTANTS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 900 TO 1,200 ACTIVE SYMPATHIZERS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. ITS MILITARY ORGANIZATION IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR COMPANIES, EACH NUMBERING BETWEEN 90 AND 120 MEN, WHICH OPERATE IN THE PROVINCES OF TUCUMAN, CORDOBA, AND BUENOS AIRES AND IN THE AREA OF ROSARIO. THE ERP IS WELL-FINANCED WITH FUNDS DERIVED FROM THE ABDUCTIONS OF BUSINESSMEN, PRIMARILY REPRESENTATIVES OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS. THE MONTONEROS ARE ALSO MARXIST-LENINISTS IN IDEOLOGY, BUT THEY COMBINE THAT PHILOSOPHY WITH THEIR OWN PARTICULAR GRAND OF PERONISM--WHICH HAS GIVEN THIS MOVEMENT A FIRM NATIONALIST FLAVOR AND A STRONG FOLLOWING AMONG THE LEFTIST PERONIST YOUTH OF ARGENTINA. WHILE THE MONTONEROS ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE AS

4

PAGE 5

SECRET

THE ONLY LEGITIMATE MEANS TO ACHIEVE POWER, THEY HAVE DEVELOPED A NUMBER OF LEGAL OR SEMI-LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATE TO SOME DEGREE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY; E.G., THEIR INVOLVEMENT THROUGH THE AUTHENTIC PARTY IN THE MISIONES PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS. THE MONTONEROS ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE 2,000 ARMED AND TRAINED COMBATANTS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 5,000 TO 10,000 ACTIVE SYMPATHIZERS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. THROUGH THEIR PAST ASSOCIATION WITH PERONISM AND THEIR CURRENT SYMPATHIZERS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, THE MONTONEROS ARE JUDGED TO HAVE A HIGH CAPABILITY TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION ON THE PLANS OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SECURITY SERVICES.)

EO25x1

2. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ARGENTINA IS PRESENTLY UNDERGOING A PERIOD OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND HIGH FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS. THE TWO ARE NOT NECESSARILY RELATED, BUT EACH HAS AN IMPACT ON THE OTHER. FROM THE POLITICAL STANDPOINT, SEVERAL POWER SECTORS OF THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THOSE WITHIN THE PRONIST MOVEMENT, ARE ATTEMPTING TO PRESSURE PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA ~~MARTINEZ~~ } A. G.  
~~DE PERON~~ INTO REMOVING JOSE ~~LOPEZ REGA~~ FROM HIS POSITION OF INFLUENCE OVER HER AND, THEREFORE, OVER GOVERNMENT POLICIES.

5

PAGE 6

~~SECRET~~

THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS ACTION COULD BE SEVERE, SINCE THE DANGER EXISTS THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD RESIGN OR THREATEN TO RESIGN IF GIVEN AN ULTIMATUM ON THIS ISSUE. THE POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION COULD COME ABOUT IN EARLY APRIL, ALTHOUGH THE LEADERS OF THE ANTI-LOPEZ REGA MOVEMENTRIGINALLY WISHED TO AVOID A POLITICAL SHOWDOWN UNTIL AFTER THE 13 APRIL ELECTIONS IN MISIONES PROVINCE. IF LOPEZ REGA AND HIS SUPPORTERS ARE OUSTED, WITH OR WITHOUT THE RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT, THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE A MODERATE CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNMENT; I.E., FROM RIGHT OF CENTER TO THE CENTER, OR EVEN TO THE LEFT OF CENTER. IN THIS SITUATION, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE DISPOSED TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE WITH THE MONTONEROS AND ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH SOME FORM OF MODUS VIVENDI. THE MONTONEROS ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY AWARE OF THE POLITICAL INFIGHTING AND ITS POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE. INDEED.

E025x1

E025x1 INTERIOR MINISTER ALBERTO ROCAMORA MAY HAVE ALREADY MET WITH LEADERS OF THE MONTONEROS' POLITICAL APPARATUS. <sup>ARG.</sup> THUS, THE TERRORISTS, AND PARTICULARLY THE MONTONEROS, ARE PROBABLY CONSIDERING ACTIONS DESIGNED TO WEAKEN THE GOVERNMENT AND

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 28 1975

TELETYPE

0 281857Z MAR 75

FM CIA

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FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
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SECTION 2 OF 3.

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CONTRIBUTE TO THE ANTI-LOPEZ REGA EFFORTS. IF THEY SHOULD BELIEVE  
THAT THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER COULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN

PAGE 2

~~SECRET~~

THE GOVERNMENT AND LOPEZ REGA, THEY MIGHT WELL BE CONTEMPLATING  
SOME ACTION DURING HIS VISIT TO DETRACT FROM ITS SUCCESS.)

EO25x1

4. [REDACTED] HAVE RECEIVED NO INFORMATION  
RELATING TO POSSIBLE PLANS OF EXTREMIST GROUPS TO ATTEMPT TO  
TAKE DIRECT TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE  
HENRY KISSINGER DURING HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES.

[REDACTED] THE  
MONTONEROS HAVE THE BEST CAPABILITY OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST  
GROUPS TO UNDERTAKE SUCH ACTION BECAUSE OF THEIR NUMERICAL  
STRENGTH AND THEIR PENETRATIONS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT,  
BUT THEIR INTENTIONS IN THIS REGARD WILL PROBABLY NOT BE KNOWN  
BEFOREHAND. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

EO25x1

9

EO25x1  
[REDACTED] THE ERP HAD PROPOSED A JOINT OPERATION TO THE MONTONEROS TO KIDNAP A U.S. OFFICIAL OR THE HEAD OF A U.S. COMPANY IN ARGENTINA, DURING OR PRECEDING THE THEN SCHEDULED MARCH MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, AS A MEANS TO EMBARRASS SECRETARY KISSINGER AND DISRUPT THE PLANNED MEETING. THE MONTONEROS [REDACTED] EO25x1 REJECTED THE ERP PROPOSAL AS BEING COUNTERPRODUCTIVE POLITICALLY, BUT IT IS NOTED THAT ON 26 FEBRUARY 1975 THE MONTONEROS ABDUCTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY MURDERED U.S. CONSULAR AGENT JOHN PATRICK EGAN IN CORDOBA.)

EO25x1  
5. [REDACTED] THE ERP, ACTING ALONE, IS NOT CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT A HIGH-RISK, SPECTACULAR ACT OF TERRORISM IN BUENOS AIRES AT THIS TIME. [REDACTED] EO25x1

[REDACTED] THE RECENT FEDERAL POLICE RAID ON THE REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ERP IN BUENOS AIRES IS JUDGED TO HAVE EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED ERP OPERATIONS FOR THE PROVINCE. THE POLICE NOT ONLY CONFISCATED LISTS OF ERP MEMBERS AND SAFE SITE ADDRESSES FOR THE PROVINCE, BUT SINCE THE HEADQUARTERS SERVED AS THE PRINCIPAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY FOR THE ERP IN THE PROVINCE, CONTACT BETWEEN ERP CELLS AND GROUPS HAS BECOME EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT. THE CONTINUING

POLICE RAIDS HAVE PLACED THE ERP ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THE PROVINCE. THE FEDERAL POLICE DO NOT DISCARD THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ERP TERRORIST ACT DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, BUT POLICE OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT DIRECT ACTION BY THE ERP ALONE IS IMPROBABLE.

EO25x1

6. [REDACTED] FOR

THE PROJECTED VISIT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, THE FEDERAL POLICE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN GUARANTEE HIS SAFETY, IF HIS STAY IN BUENOS AIRES IS ONLY FOR A FEW DAYS. IN SUCH A SHORT SPACE OF TIME, THE FEDERAL POLICE WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE ENVIRONMENT AND PREVENT ANY PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST HIM. THE POLICE WOULD USE AS MANY OFFICIALS AS DEEMED NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS--UP TO 10,000 UNIFORMED POLICE AND INCLUDING AS MANY AS 500 OFFICERS OF FEDERAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE. THE UNIFORMED POLICE WOULD CLEAR THE STREETS OVER WHICH THE SECRETARY WOULD TRAVEL AND THE AREAS WHICH HE VISITS. THE POLICE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WOULD WORK IN PLAIN CLOTHES TO MONITOR THE CROWDS DURING ANY POSSIBLE PUBLIC APPEARANCE BY THE SECRETARY. [REDACTED] COMMENT: JUDGING FROM PAST EXPERIENCE, THE POLICE WOULD ALSO PLACE AGENTS AND OFFICIALS AT THE TRADITIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS IN THE CITY IN ORDER

EO25x1

10

TO MONITOR ACTIVITIES AND DISRUPT ANY EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE  
DEMONSTRATIONS.)

EO25x1

8. THE PCA WAS OPPOSED TO SECRETARY UISSINGER'S SCHEDULED  
VISIT IN MARCH 1975 AND WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE OPPOSED TO  
ANOTHER SCHEDULED VISIT. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE  
VISIT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED AT A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE  
PCA [REDACTED] AND THAT APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES WILL BE ISSUED  
[REDACTED] THE PCA IS EXPECTED TO MOUNT A PROPAGANDA  
CAMPAIGN, I.E., THE PUBLICATION OF LEAFLETS, WALL PAINTINGS,

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PAGE 6

~~SECRET~~

AGITATION IN FACTORIES, ETC. IF HIS VISIT IS PROLONGED, THE PARTY  
MAY ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS. [REDACTED] COMMENT:  
PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD BE THE MAXIMUM ACTION AGAINST  
SECRETARY KISSINGER THAT THE PCA WOULD ATTEMPT. SUCH DEMONSTR-  
TIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER LEFTIST GROUPS,  
WHICH WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ATTEMPT TO PROTEST HIS PRESENCE IN  
THE COUNTRY WITH STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROPAGANDA.) [REDACTED]  
COMMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS OF THIS NATURE NORMALLY DO NOT PRESENT  
THE POLICE WITH MUCH OF A PROBLEM TO CONTROL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EFFORTS BY THE

PRT TO MOBILIZE ARGENTINE TROTSKYIST GROUPS FOR A WIDESPREAD  
BOMBING CAMPAIGN AND LIGHTNING STREET DEMONSTRATIONS TO PROTEST  
THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND BOMBING  
ATTACKS WERE REPORTEDLY TO TAKE PLACE WHILE THE SECRETARY WAS IN  
THE COUNTRY.)

[REDACTED]

12

EO25x1

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 28 1975

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- Intelligence Sources and  
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FINAL SECTION OF 3.

13

EO25x1

10.


**POLICE CHIEF LUIS MARGARIDE RESIGNED**  
EFFECTIVE 21 MARCH 1975. IF TRUE, THIS SIGNIFIES A NUMBER OF  
CHANGES AMONG HIGH-LEVEL POLICE POSITIONS, AS THE NEW CHIEF WILL  
PROBABLY APPOINT MEN OF HIS CONFIDENCE TO THE SENIOR POSTS. ALSO,  
COMMISSIONER MAJOR EDUARDO PEDRO RAMIREZ, WHO FOR ALL  
PRACTICAL PURPOSES HAS BEEN THE OPERATIONS CHIEF OF FEDERAL  
POLICE INTELLIGENCE, WAS TRANSFERRED ON 21 MARCH TO AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION AS CHIEF OF SUPPLY. RAMIREZ RESIGNED  
IN PROTEST. **COMMENT: THE POSSIBLE CHANGES OF HIGH-  
LEVEL POLICE OFFICIALS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO HAVE MUCH OF AN  
IMPACT ON THE CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE TO PROVIDE PROTECTIN  
TO VISITING DIGNITARIES. THE ACTUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING  
AND MOUNTING PROTECTION SERVICES WILL BE IN THE HANDS OF SENIOR  
POLICE EXPERTS IN THIS FIELD, WHO WILL REMAIN IN THEIR POSITIONS  
DESPITE POSSIBLE CHANGES AT THE TOP ELVEL IN THE INSTITUTION.)**

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REPORT CLASS SECRET/

EO25x1

14



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15



# Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE/SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PRIORITY

IN 535623

PAGE 1 OF 11 PAGES

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Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

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**SECRET**

DIST 28 MARCH 1975

*Political matters*

*S-RIO*

*RD*  
COUNTRY : ARGENTINA

*109-12-201*

SUBJECT : ~~SECURITY SITUATION REPORT. ASSESSMENT OF THE  
POTENTIAL TERRORIST AND EXTREMIST THREAT TO  
SECRETARY KISSINGER AS OF 27 MARCH 1975~~

EO25x1 SUMMARY. ACCORDING TO AN EXPERIENCED POLICE INTELLIGENCE  
OFFICER, ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES HAVE NOT RECEIVED

*REC-5A 109-12-201-2948*  
[REDACTED] RELATING TO POSSIBLE TERRORIST PLANS TO

UNDERTAKE HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY APR 1 1975

KISSINGER DURING HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES.

*EO25x1*  
OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS, [REDACTED] ONLY THE  
MONTONEROS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO ATTEMPT SUCH ACTION. AS THE  
PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) ORGANIZATION IN BUENOS AIRES  
PROVINCE HAS BEEN SEVERELY DISRUPTED BY RECENT POLICE ACTION  
THE MASSIVE SECURITY MOBILIZATION BY THE ARGENTINE SERVICES

Copy to: Bureau Chief  
By: routing slip for  
Info  action  
date 3-21-75  
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FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
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IN 535623

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MAP SENSITIVE: INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 11 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

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(declass controls)

WILL PROBABLY ACT AS A DETERRENT TO ANY ATTEMPT TO UNDER-  
TAKE DIRECT ACTION AGAINST SECRETARY KISSINGER, BUT THE  
POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT PLANS WILL BE MADE TO CARRY OUT OTHER  
ACTS OF TERRORISM IN ORDER TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. OFFICIAL AND  
DETRACT FROM THE SUCCESS OF HIS VISIT. IT IS EXPECTED THAT  
MOST LEFTIST GROUPS, INCLUDING THE TERRORISTS, WILL UNDERTAKE  
HARRASSMENT OPERATIONS, SUCH AS BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST  
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REPLACEMENT OF THE CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE IS EXPECTED MOMEN-  
TARILY, ALONG WITH A CORRESPONDING SHIFTING OF HIGH-LEVEL POLICE  
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ON THE CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE TO PROTECT SECRETARY KISSINGER.

END SUMMARY.

EO25x1

1.  COMMENT: IT IS JUDGED THAT OF THE SEVERAL TERRORIST  
GROUPS OPERATING IN ARGENTINA, ONLY THE ERP AND THE MONTONEROS  
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KISSINGER. THE ERP, WHICH OPERATES UNDER THE POLITICAL UMBRELLA  
OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' PARTY (PRT), IS A MARXIST-LENINIST  
ORGANIZATION WHOSE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS TO IMPLANT A MARXIST  
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FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

IN 535623

WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 3 OF 11 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(downgrade controls)

THOUGH HISTORICALLY IT HAS ENJOYED A HIGH DEGREE OF SUCCESS WITH THE TRADITIONAL TACTICS OF URBAN WARFARE, THE ERP BEGAN TO EMPHASIZE RURAL GUERRILLA ACTIONS IN JANUARY 1974, WITH UNEVEN SUCCESS THUS FAR. THE ERP HAS AN ESTIMATED 400 TO 600 ARMED AND TRAINED COMBANTANTS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 900 TO 1,200 ACTIVE SYMPATHIZERS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. ITS MILITARY ORGANIZATION IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR COMPANIES, EACH NUMBERING BETWEEN 90 AND 120 MEN, WHICH OPERATE IN THE PROVINCES OF TUCUMAN, CORDOBA, AND BUENOS AIRES AND IN THE AREA OF ROSARIO. THE ERP IS WELL-FINANCED WITH FUNDS DERIVED FROM THE ABDUCTIONS OF BUSINESSMEN,

*ORGANIZATION*  
PRIMARILY REPRESENTATIVES OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS. THE ~~MONTONEROS~~ ARE ALSO MARXIST-LENINISTS IN IDEOLOGY, BUT THEY COMBINE THAT PHILOSOPHY WITH THEIR OWN PARTICULAR GRAND OF PERONISM--WHICH HAS GIVEN THIS MOVEMENT A FIRM NATIONALIST FLAVOR AND A STRONG FOLLOWING AMONG THE LEFTIST PERONIST YOUTH OF ARGENTINA. WHILE THE MONTONEROS ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE AS THE ONLY LEGITIMATE MEANS TO ACHIEVE POWER, THEY HAVE DEVELOPED A NUMBER OF LEGAL OR SEMI-LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATE TO SOME DEGREE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY: E.G., THEIR INVOLVEMENT THROUGH THE AUTHENTIC PARTY IN THE MISIONES PROVINCIAL

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4  
FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

IN 535623

WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 4 OF 11 PAGES

**SECRET**

(classification)

(dissem controls)

ELECTIONS. THE MONTONEROS ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE 2,000 ARMED AND TRAINED COMBATANTS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 5,000 TO 10,000 ACTIVE SYMPATHIZERS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. THROUGH THEIR PAST ASSOCIATION WITH PERONISM AND THEIR CURRENT SYMPATHIZERS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, THE MONTONEROS ARE JUDGED TO HAVE A HIGH CAPABILITY TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION ON THE PLANS OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SECURITY SERVICES.)

EO25x1

2. COMMENT: ARGENTINA IS PRESENTLY UNDERGOING A PERIOD OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND HIGH FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS. THE TWO ARE NOT NECESSARILY RELATED, BUT EACH HAS AN IMPACT ON THE OTHER. FROM THE POLITICAL STANDPOINT, SEVERAL POWER SECTORS OF THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THOSE WITHIN THE PERONIST MOVEMENT, ARE ATTEMPTING TO PRESSURE PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA MARTINEZ DE PERON INTO REMOVING JOSE LOPEZ REGA FROM HIS POSITION OF INFLUENCE OVER HER AND, THEREFORE, OVER GOVERNMENT POLICIES. THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS ACTION COULD BE SEVERE, SINCE THE DANGER EXISTS THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD RESIGN OR THREATEN TO RESIGN IF GIVEN AN ULTIMATUM ON THIS ISSUE. THE POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION COULD COME ABOUT IN EARLY APRIL, ALTHOUGH THE LEADERS OF THE ANTI-LOPEZ REGA MOVEMENT ORIGINALLY WISHED TO

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FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1)  
Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

IN 535623

WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 5 OF 11 PAGES

**SECRET**

(class/location)

(dissem controls)

AVOID A POLITICAL SHOWDOWN UNTIL AFTER THE 13 APRIL ELECTIONS IN MISIONES PROVINCE. IF LOPEZ REGA AND HIS SUPPORTERS ARE DUSTED, WITH OR WITHOUT THE RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT, THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE A MODERATE CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNMENT; I.E., FROM RIGHT OF CENTER TO THE CENTER, OR EVEN TO THE LEFT OF CENTER. IN THIS SITUATION, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE DISPOSED TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE WITH THE MONTONEROS AND ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH SOME FORM OF MODUS VIVENDI. THE MONTONEROS ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY AWARE OF THE POLITICAL INFIGHTING AND ITS POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE. INDEED,

EO25x1

INTERIOR MINISTER ALBERTO ROCAMORA MAY HAVE ALREADY ARG  
MET WITH LEADERS OF THE MONTONEROS' POLITICAL APPARATUS. THUS,  
THE TERRORISTS, AND PARTICULARLY THE MONTONEROS, ARE PROBABLY  
CONSIDERING ACTIONS DESIGNED TO WEAKEN THE GOVERNMENT AND  
CONTRIBUTE TO THE ANTI-LOPEZ REGA EFFORTS. IF THEY SHOULD BELIEVE  
THAT THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER COULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN  
THE GOVERNMENT AND LOPEZ REGA, THEY MIGHT WELL BE CONTEMPLATING  
SOME ACTION DURING HIS VISIT TO DETRACT FROM ITS SUCCESS.)

EO25x1

SECRET

5

IN 535623

WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 6 OF 11 PAGES

**SECRET**

(classification)

(dissem controls)

FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

4.

HAVE RECEIVED NO INFORMATION

EO25x1

RELATING TO POSSIBLE PLANS OF EXTREMIST GROUPS TO ATTEMPT TO  
TAKE DIRECT TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE  
HENRY KISSINGER DURING HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES.

THE  
MONTONEROS HAVE THE BEST CAPABILITY OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST  
GROUPS TO UNDERTAKE SUCH ACTION BECAUSE OF THEIR NUMERICAL  
STRENGTH AND THEIR PENETRATIONS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT,  
BUT THEIR INTENTIONS IN THIS REGARD WILL PROBABLY NOT BE KNOWN

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IN 835623

PAGE 7 OF 11 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

**SECRET**

(classification)

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FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

BEFOREHAND.

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5.

THE ERP, ACTING

ALONE, IS NOT CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT A HIGH-RISK, SPECTACULAR  
ACT OF TERRORISM IN BUENOS AIRES AT THIS TIME.

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THE RECENT FEDERAL POLICE RAID ON THE REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS  
OF THE ERP IN BUENOS AIRES IS JUDGED TO HAVE EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED  
ERP OPERATIONS FOR THE PROVINCE. THE POLICE NOT ONLY CONFISCATED  
LISTS OF ERP MEMBERS AND SAFE SITE ADDRESSES FOR THE PROVINCE, BUT  
SINCE THE HEADQUARTERS SERVED AS THE PRINCIPAL COMMUNICATIONS  
FACILITY FOR THE ERP IN THE PROVINCE, CONTACT BETWEEN ERP CELLS

**SECRET**

IN 535623

8  
WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 8 OF 11 PAGES

**SECRET**

(classification)

(dissem controls)

FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

AND GROUPS HAS BECOME EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT. THE CONTINUING POLICE RAIDS HAVE PLACED THE ERP ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THE PROVINCE. THE FEDERAL POLICE DO NOT DISCARD THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ERP TERRORIST ACT DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, BUT POLICE OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT DIRECT ACTION BY THE ERP ALONE IS IMPROBABLE. EO25x1

6. [REDACTED] FOR THE PROJECTED VISIT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, THE FEDERAL POLICE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN GUARANTEE HIS SAFETY, IF HIS STAY IN BUENOS AIRES IS ONLY FOR A FEW DAYS. IN SUCH A SHORT SPACE OF TIME, THE FEDERAL POLICE WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE ENVIRONMENT AND PREVENT ANY PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST HIM. THE POLICE WOULD USE AS MANY OFFICIALS AS DEEMED NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS--UP TO 10,000 UNIFORMED POLICE AND INCLUDING AS MANY AS 500 OFFICERS OF FEDERAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE. THE UNIFORMED POLICE WOULD CLEAR THE STREETS OVER WHICH THE SECRETARY WOULD TRAVEL AND THE AREAS WHICH HE VISITS. THE POLICE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WOULD WORK IN PLAIN CLOTHES TO MONITOR THE CROWDS DURING ANY POSSIBLE PUBLIC APPEARANCE BY THE SECRETARY. [REDACTED] COMMENT: JUDGING FROM PAST EXPERIENCE, THE POLICE WOULD ALSO PLACE AGENTS AND OFFICIALS AT THE TRADITIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS IN THE CITY IN ORDER

EO25x1

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IN 535623

WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

**SECRET**

[REDACTED] PAGE 9 OF 11 PAGES

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

(classification) 1 (dissem controls)

TO MONITOR ACTIVITIES AND DISRUPT ANY EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE  
DEMONSTRATIONS.)

[REDACTED] EO25x1

8. THE PCA WAS OPPOSED TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S SCHEDULED  
VISIT IN MARCH 1975 AND WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE OPPOSED TO  
ANOTHER SCHEDULED VISIT. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE  
VISIT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED AT A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE  
PCA [REDACTED] AND THAT APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES WILL BE ISSUED  
[REDACTED] THE PCA IS EXPECTED TO MOUNT A PROPAGANDA  
CAMPAIGN, I.E., THE PUBLICATION OF LEAFLETS, WALL PAINTINGS,  
AGITATION IN FACTORIES, ETC. IF HIS VISIT IS PROLONGED, THE PARTY  
MAY ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS. [REDACTED] COMMENTS:  
EO25x1

**SECRET** 9

EO25x1

IN 535623

WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 10 OF 11 PAGES

**SECRET**

(classification)

(dissem controls)

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD BE THE MAXIMUM ACTION AGAINST SECRETARY KISSINGER THAT THE PCA WOULD ATTEMPT. SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER LEFTIST GROUPS, WHICH WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ATTEMPT TO PROTEST HIS PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY WITH STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROPAGANDA.) ( [REDACTED] )  
COMMENTS: DEMONSTRATIONS OF THIS NATURE NORMALLY DO NOT PRESENT THE POLICE WITH MUCH OF A PROBLEM TO CONTROL. [REDACTED]

EO25x1

[REDACTED] BY THE

PRT TO MOBILIZE ARGENTINE TROTSKYIST GROUPS FOR A WIDESPREAD BOMBING CAMPAIGN AND LIGHTNING STREET DEMONSTRATIONS TO PROTEST THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND BOMBING ATTACKS WERE REPORTEDLY TO TAKE PLACE WHILE THE SECRETARY WAS IN THE COUNTRY.)

[REDACTED]

SECRET

IN 535623

WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 11 OF 11 PAGES

**SECRET**

(classification)

(dissem controls)

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

EO25x1

*Arg*

POLICE CHIEF LUIS MARGARIDE RESIGNED *ARG*  
EFFECTIVE 21 MARCH 1975. IF TRUE, THIS SIGNIFIES A NUMBER OF  
CHANGES AMONG HIGH-LEVEL POLICE POSITIONS, AS THE NEW CHIEF WILL  
PROBABLY APPOINT MEN OF HIS CONFIDENCE TO THE SENIOR POSTS. ALSO,  
COMMISSIONER MAJOR EDUARDO PEDRO RAMIREZ, WHO FOR ALL *ARG*  
PRACTICAL PURPOSES HAS BEEN THE OPERATIONS CHIEF OF FEDERAL  
POLICE INTELLIGENCE, WAS TRANSFERRED ON 21 MARCH TO AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION AS CHIEF OF SUPPLY. RAMIREZ RESIGNED  
IN PROTEST. *EO25x1* COMMENT: THE POSSIBLE CHANGES OF HIGH-  
LEVEL POLICE OFFICIALS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO HAVE MUCH OF AN  
IMPACT ON THE CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE TO PROVIDE PROTECTION  
TO VISITING DIGNITARIES. THE ACTUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING  
AND MOUNTING PROTECTION SERVICES WILL BE IN THE HANDS OF SENIOR  
POLICE EXPERTS IN THIS FIELD, WHO WILL REMAIN IN THEIR POSITIONS  
DESPITE POSSIBLE CHANGES AT THE TOP LEVEL IN THE INSTITUTION.)

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EO25x1

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1)  
- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAP 17 107

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5:00 PM URGENT 3-12-73 JH TELETYPE

TO DIRECTOR - ATTENTION: LIAISON SECTION - NO. GGD-17

LEGAZ BRASILIA 1960-1

FROM LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (66-2) (66-10) 44

Official Postage - One cent

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SECURITY OF BUENOS AIRES OFFICE PERSONNEL

RENYCASS 5/4 AND 5/10/75 CAPTIONED "FOREIGN POLITICAL  
MATTERS - ARGENTINA 1 IS - ARGENTINA 2"

FOLLOWING DATA IS SUPPLIED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION  
OF THE BUREAU:

DURING THE PAST WEEK EIGHT FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) AND PROVINCIAL POLICE (PP) OFFICERS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN TERRORIST TACTICS AND AMBUSHES. SEVERAL INDEPENDENT TERRORIST GRENADE ATTACKS HAVE ALSO BEEN CARRIED OUT AGAINST FPA AND PP BUILDINGS AND VEHICLES. FPA SOURCES REPORT THE ABOVE ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE ERP AND MONTONERS TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN RETALIATION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S ACCELERATED ANTI-TERRORIST DRIVE WHICH HAS RESULTED IN A SUMMARY EXECUTION OF TERRORIST PRISONERS BY GOVERNMENT FORCES.

END PAGE ONE

1977-2-23

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NW 54739 DocId:32986735 Page 33

SUE 66-2; 66-50

PAGE TWO

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THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE EMBASSY AND ITS PERSONNEL HAVE OCCURRED DURING THE PAST WEEK:

DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 3/18/75, TWO VEHICLES SPED BY THE U. S. EMBASSY RESIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL AND THEIR OCCUPANTS DISCHARGED HANDGUNS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE EMBASSY RESIDENCE. FPA OFFICERS ULTIMATELY RECOVERED ONE OF THE ABANDONED VEHICLES WHICH CONTAINED STOLEN MILITARY AMMUNITION. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE EMBASSY RESIDENCE AND NO INJURIES.

DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 3/18/75, THE TEEN-AGE DAUGHTER OF THE U. S. DEFENSE ATTACHE WAS ACCOSTED AND HARASSED ON THE STREET NEAR HER RESIDENCE IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE BY AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE INDIVIDUAL DRIVING AN AUTOMOBILE. AFTER FOLLOWING THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S DAUGHTER FOR SEVERAL BLOCKS, THE UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDED DIRECTLY TO HER RESIDENCE AND WAITED FOR HER TO ARRIVE. UPON HER ARRIVAL AT THE RESIDENCE, THE UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUAL TOLD HER THAT "WE KNOW WHERE YOU LIVE. YOU HAD BETTER WATCH YOUR STEP."

END PAGE TWO

BUE 66-2; 66-59

PAGE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 3/13/75, THE DEFENSE ATTACHE WAS PROCEEDING TO HIS RESIDENCE TO CHECK ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS DAUGHTER AS A RESULT OF 3/10/75 INCIDENT ENUMERATED ABOVE. WHEN HE APPROACHED HIS RESIDENCE TWO AUTOMOBILES CONTAINING FOUR INDIVIDUALS EACH CONDUCTED WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ATTEMPTED BLOCKING ACTION; HOWEVER, THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S CHAUFFEUR DETECTED THE TWO AUTOMOBILES IN TIME TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION AND CARRY OUT AN ESCAPE. NO TRACE COULD BE FOUND OF THE AUTOMOBILES OR THEIR OCCUPANTS.

DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 3/16/75, THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER WAS FOLLOWED BY FOUR INDIVIDUALS IN AN AUTOMOBILE AS HE LEFT THE EMBASSY. IN A CHASE THAT REACHED SPEEDS OF 80 MILES PER HOUR THROUGH DOWNTOWN STREETS, THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER WAS ABLE TO ELUDE HIS PURSUERS AND ESCAPE WITHOUT ANY ACTION BEING TAKEN ON THEIR PART.

IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT DURING THE 3/10, 3/13/ AND 3/16/75 INCIDENTS, IT COULD NOT BE POSITIVELY ESTABLISHED THAT THESE

END PAGE THREE

DUE 66-21 66-50

PAGE FOUR

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INCIDENTS WERE CARRIED OUT BY TERRORISTS; HOWEVER, AN ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION WOULD LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY PROBABLY WERE TERRORIST-ORIENTED ACTS.

LEGAT PERSONNEL ARE CONTINUING TO TAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES. THE BUREAU WILL BE PROMPTLY ADVISED OF ANY ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE SAFETY AND WELLBEING OF FBI PERSONNEL IN BUENOS AIRES.

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END.

*BCS*  
7-17-70  
A-4324 JAH